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II. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee recognizes this Court's power to hear the appeal 
on the issue of permanent alimony pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah 
Code, but challenges this Court's jurisdiction, as hereinafter 
argued, to hear the issue of temporary alimony. 
III. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether this Court can consider Plaintiff's attempt 
to appeal the Court's denial to her of temporary alimony in its 
order of September 30, 1991, where 
1) No appeal was taken from the order pursuant to Rules 
3 and/or 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
2) No permission was sought or granted to appeal the 
order under the provisions of Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, relating to interlocutory order; and 
3) No attempt was made on the part of Plaintiff to 
preserve the issue of the denial of temporary alimony. 
iii 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Error in Law 
Authority: 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
B. Whether the Court erred in denying Plaintiff's 
Petition to Modify to increase alimony. 
Standard of Appellate Review; 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority: 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Ut. App. 1991) 
Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (1992) 
English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977) 
Harding v. Harding, Utah, 488 P.2d 308 (1971) 
Paffel v. Paffel, Utah, 48 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1986) 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Ut. App. 1989) 
Walker v. Walker, Utah, 707 P.2d 110 (1985) 
Watson v. Watson, 194 Ut Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut. App. 1992) 
iv 
C. Whether the Court erred in refusing to award 
Plaintiff attorney fees. 
Standard of Appellate Review: 
Abuse of Discretion 
Authority; 
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Ut. App. 1991) 
Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Ut. Adv. Rep. 49 (Ut. App. 
1992) 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Ut. App. 1988) 
IV. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code: 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to 
make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties,, the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
2. Rules 3, 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
See addendum 
v 
V. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below and 
Disposition. 
Plaintiff appeals the order of the order of the Honorable 
David S. Young of March 3, 1992, denying Plaintiff's PETITION FOR 
MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE dated August 22, 1991. Plaintiff 
also purports to appeal this Court's ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 
ALIMONY dated September 30, 1991, which resulted in the Court's 
denial to Plaintiff of her motion for temporary alimony. 
The instant petition was originally filed on August 22, 
1991, and later amended by Plaintiff's AMENDED PEITION FOR 
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE, filed on January 13, 1992, wherein 
Plaintiff asked for the following relief insofar as alimony is 
concerned: 
A. For an order granting alimony to plaintiff 
in a reasonable amount per month until 
plaintiff is able to meet her current monthly 
expenses without such an award; . . . (R. 306, 
fA) 
The matter was heard at trial on February 11, 1992. 
Plaintiff testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of 
1 
two "friendly" witnesses. Thereafter Plaintiff called Defendant as 
an adverse witness and rested. (R. , 488) At the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case in chief Defendant moved to dismiss, which motion 
was granted by the Court. (R. , 492) At no time thereafter did 
Plaintiff move to amend pleadings, re-open the case to offer 
additional testimony or seek any relief from the Court of any 
nature whatsoever. The instant appeal followed the entry of this 
Court's ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO MODIFY on March 3, 1992. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
1. These parties were divorced by DECREE OF DIVORCE 
entered in this Court on November 29, 1982. Plaintiff was awarded 
under that decree alimony in the amount of $1.00 per year. (R, 
133) 
2. The Court made no findings regarding the reason for 
granting alimony in the original decree. Indeed, the decree, save 
the issue of custody of Mark Wells, was entered into pursuant to 
stipulation. (R, 129) 
3. The Decree of Divorce also had provided that 
Defendant was granted a lien on the parties' marital residence of 
$15,000.00, payable when the house was sold, within 6 months of the 
2 
youngest child's reaching 18 or within 6 month's of Plaintiff's 
remarriage or cohabitation. (R, 134-135) 
4. This $15,000.00 lien in Defendant's favor was never 
paid and was bankrupted by Plaintiff. (R, 350, 54-6; and R, 357-8, 
f2-3) 
5. Plaintiff's first attempt to increase the alimony 
award came on June 17, 1989, when she filed a VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE, in which she requested, inter 
alia, that [t}he court should increase the alimony ordered to be 
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to a minimum of $1,500.00 per 
month." (R., 246, f (b)) 
6. Defendant answered, denying the material 
allegations, and counterclaimed for a change in custody and other 
relief. (R., 250-255) 
7. Defendant sought in his AMENDED COUNTER-PETITION TO 
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE dated April 18, 1990 to secure payment of 
the $15,000.00 lien (R, 272-277). Although the Court did not allow 
the actual filing of the amended counter-petition, it did recognize 
that the factual bases presented therein could be considered. (R, 
291) 
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8. Plaintiff's June 17, 1989 Petition and Defendant's 
Counter-petition were resolved by stipulation on August, 9, 1990, 
and the Court thereafter entered its ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF 
DIVORCE AND ON PENDING MATTERS dated November 1, 1990• Pursuant to 
that stipulation Plaintiff's petition to increase alimony was 
dismissed, (R., 303, f 5) as were Defendant's claims to secure 
payment of the $15,000 lien. (R., 302) 
9. The instant petition was originally filed on August, 
22, 1991, but was amended in the form of Plaintiff's AMENDED 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE dated January 13, 1992. 
The latter sought, consistently with the former, the following 
relief insofar as the question of alimony is concerned: 
A. For an order granting alimony to plaintiff 
in a reasonable amount per month until 
plaintiff is able to meet her current monthly 
expenses without such an award; . . . (R. , 
3 06, f A) [emphasis added] 
10. At the time of the trial on February 11, 1992, 
Defendant sought the Court's ruling that the issue of alimony was 
res judicata prior to November 1, 1990, the date of the order 
denying the June 17, 1989 petition to raise alimony (R., 441-443) 
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but the Court denied the motion without prejudice (R. , 444) and 
never specifically ruled on the issue. 
11. In any event, the evidence before the Court on 
February 11, 1992 relevant to the requirements of Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App., 1989), discussed in detail below 
at pages 17-19, is outlined as follows: 
a) Plaintiff, at the time of the trial, was employed 
and making $3,000.00 per month. (R, 439) 
b) Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce in early 1983 was approximately $11,000.00 per year. 
(R, 441) 
c) At the trial on February 11, 1992, Plaintiff also 
testified that Defendant was making $42,000 to $43,000.00 per year 
at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, (R., 445) which 
testimony was uncontroverted in that Defendant did not remember his 
salary at that time. (R., 487) 
d) Defendant's income at the time of the trial on 
February 11, 1992 was $5,600 per month, or $67,200 yearly. (R. , 
486) 
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e) Plaintiff was employed at Becton-Dickenson from 1980 
to 1984. (R, 445-446) 
f) After approximately two months unemployment, 
Plaintiff found a job with Wicat Systems in Orem, Utah. (R, 446-
447) 
g) In February of 1985, Plaintiff took employment with 
her Hercules Aerospace in Magna, Utah, which employment lasted 
until December, 1986 (R, 447) 
h) In February, 1987, Plaintiff secured employment with 
Morton-Thiokol, which lasted until June of 1990. (R, 448) 
i) Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment at 
Morton-Thiokol. (R, 453) 
j) Plaintiff then took employment with Futura 
Industries at $40,000.00 per year on June 29, 1990, the day after 
she left Morton-Thiokol. (R, 454) 
k) Plaintiff lost her job at Futura Industries on 
September 10 [1990], over allegations of sexual harassment and 
Plaintiff's suit against them with the UEOC. (R, 4 54) 
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1) Beginning in January, 1991, Plaintiff secured 
employment at Edo Corporation at $36,000.00 per year. This 
employment lasted until May 24, 1991. (R, 454-455) 
m) Plaintiff received unemployment compensation from 
the time of her termination at Edo Corporation until January 20, 
1992, when Plaintiff became employed at her present employment. 
(R, 455-456) 
n) During the period of Plaintiff's unemployment before 
her present employment, she received over $6,000.00 in unemployment 
benefits, along with approximately $4,500.00 in child support 
payments from Defendant. (R, 471-472) 
o) Plaintiff had fallen behind in her obligations as a 
result of her unemployment, prior to finding her present job. (R., 
457-460) 
12. At the conclusion of the evidence the Court then 
made the following findings: 
All right. I have reviewed the facts that you 
present, Mr. Hanks, and the - I think the 
court would be obligated to find that there 
has been a change in circumstance just simply 
by the fact of unemployment and in re-
employment and those kinds of events occurring 
in Ms. Wells1 life, but at the same time I do 
believe that there is no establishment of 
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sufficient evidence to justify a change in 
requiring alimony be paid. 
In fact, it strikes me that under the 
circumstances of this case both of these 
parties are uniquely able to earn substantial 
amounts of money to meet their needs and 
obligations. Her employment has been 
$40,000.00, is now $30,000.00. There are 
decisions associated with that employment that 
she must make as to whether she is going to 
reside in Utah, in Layton, or whether she is 
going to move to Idaho Falls where the job 
is, her family, her circumstances, her 
children, justify the move to Idaho Falls. 
The determination to leave the job because she 
was dissatisfied with the travel challenges, 
those are all decisions that everybody has to 
make in the normal course of their life. 
I don't see that the circumstances of this 
case could establish a sufficient basis for 
the court to conclude that I ought to do 
anything with the alimony. As a matter of 
fact, I have some basic concerns about the 
protection of the one-year, or the one dollar 
per year provision under the circumstances of 
this case because both parties are able-bodied 
persons and able to earn income. . . . 
So based upon the testimony that I have heard, 
the presentations that have been presented 
here, the court finds that the petition to 
modify should be and the same is hereby 
denied. (R, 60-62) 
13. The court, upon further questioning on the part of 
Plaintiff's attorney, made an additional finding as follows: 
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. . . the circumstances of the fact that she 
has been unable to develop seniority, those 
circumstances are no different than an awful 
lot of other people. She now has the 
opportunity to be employed at $30,000.00 a 
year, and that's more substantial than 
probably 60 percent of our population, if not 
more, and that, to me, is adequate income to 
meet her needs. 
14. Contrary to Plaintiff's representations, Judge Young 
never specifically ruled that there was a "substantial" change in 
circumstances shown by Plaintiff, although he did acknowledge a 
"change." (R., 490) In view of the result, however, that is a 
moot point. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff cannot appeal the denial of her request 
for temporary alimony pendente lite of September 30, 1991, in that 
Plaintiff has failed to follow the appellate procedure of Rules 3, 
4 and 5 by failing to appeal the order as a final order; by failing 
to seek the Appellate Court's approval by appealing the order as an 
interlocutory order; and by failing to preserve the issue of 
temporary alimony for later appeal. 
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2. With regard to Plaintiff's petition to increase 
alimony, the Court is vested with broad discretion, and the 
findings and conclusions of the trial court are presumed to be 
correct, unless appellant can show a clear abuse of discretion. 
The trial Court has considered the three Schindler factors as 
required by law and concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to 
an increase in alimony. Given the consideration of those factors, 
the Court's conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled to an 
increase in alimony is well within the Court's discretion, and does 
not constitute an abuse thereof. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
1. PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF TEMPORARY 
ALIMONY IS IMPROPER. 
Plaintiff identifies as an issue on appeal the Court's 
denial of PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT 
AND ALIMONY, filed August 22, 1991. (R, 315-318) It is undisputed 
that the Court denied the motion for temporary alimony in its ORDER 
ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY, signed and entered on September 
30, 1991. (R, 361-362) As the following discussion will show, 
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Plaintiff failed to take the appropriate actions to preserve or 
appeal that order, and cannot now present that issue to this Court. 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (URAP), 
provides the circumstances under which an appeal may be taken from 
a trial court as follows: 
An appeal may be taken from a district . . . 
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the appeal from all final orders and 
judgments . . . by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. [emphasis added] 
Rule 4, URAP, provides in pertinent part that 
[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as 
a matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 3 0 days after the entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 4(e) URAP provides that the trial court may extend 
the time within which an appeal may be filed, but no motion for 
extension has been filed in this case, and the provisions of 4(e) 
are therefore inapplicable. 
There may be an issue of whether or not the order denying 
the motion for temporary alimony is a "final order." A judgment 
which is "final" for purposes of an appeal has been held to be an 
11 
order "that ends the controversy between the parties litigant." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Lavton, Utah, 600 P.2d 538 (1979) See also 
Kessimakias v. Kessimakias. Utah, 546 P. 2d 888 (1976). Clearly the 
September 30, 1991 order ended the controversy of alimony pendente 
lite, and is arguably final in that sense. However, even if the 
September 30, 1991 order is interlocutory in nature, it cannot now 
be presented on appeal, as is discussed below. 
The rules relating to interlocutory orders differ from 
those relating to final judgment, and are reflected in Rule 5, URAP 
as follows: 
5(a) An appeal from an interlocutory order 
may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order with the clerk of the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the 
order of the trial court, with proof service 
on all other parties to the action. 
Rule 5 then goes on to specify the requirements of the 
content of the petition and other requirements. It is again 
undisputed that Plaintiff did not petition this Court for 
permission to appeal the order denying temporary alimony. Neither 
did Plaintiff seek to preserve as error the denial of the motion 
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for temporary alimony, as would otherwise be necessary to now 
appeal that order. Haslam v. Paulsen, Utah, 389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Accordingly, the Court does not have to determine whether 
or not the order denying alimony was final or temporary, since 
Plaintiff has not complied with either Rule 3 or 5, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Neither has Plaintiff sought to preserve as 
error the denial of temporary alimony, and this Court, for that 
reason, lacks jurisdiction over the question of temporary alimony. 
2. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY 
WAS PROPER. 
A. Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Requests only 
Temporary Alimony. 
Plaintiff's AMENDED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE 
OF DIVORCE dated January 13, 1992, alleges, inter alia, that 
Plaintiff " . . . has recently been laid off 
from her job as a result of a work force 
reduction [and that as a result] she has 
indefinitely lost the means to adequately 
support herself and provide adequate support 
and care for the minor child in her custody, 
Craig Wells." (R, 402) 
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The prayer of the Amended Petition specifically asks to 
modify the Decree of Divorce, but insofar as alimony is concerned, 
only 
. until Plaintiff is able to meet her 
current monthly expenses without such an award 
[•] 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff made no motions pursuant 
to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend his pleadings 
at the time of trial, or thereafter, for that matter. Other than 
amendment as a matter of right, which decidedly does not apply 
here, Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
[o]therwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent 
of the adverse party; . . • 
It is recognized that Rule 15(a) gives the court 
discretion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
presented at trial, but no motions were made and no orders uttered 
to allow such amendment. Clearly, then, Plaintiff was only seeking 
alimony on a temporary basis. 
B. The Court's Action in Denying Plaintifffs Petition to 
Modify was not an Abuse of Discretion. 
14 
Plaintiff's brief on appeal is devoid of any criticism of 
the Court's findings or their adequacy. Plaintiff's position is, 
rather, that the Court's conclusion was an abuse of its discretion. 
Defendant wishes to make the point that the Court's conclusion and 
findings come clothed with the presumption of validity, which 
presumption of validity must guide this Court in its review of the 
trial court's actions. 
The trial Court's discretion is very broad, and that 
discretion clearly extends to issues relating to modifications, as 
this case is. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Ut.App., 
1990) Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in Harding v. 
Harding. Utah, 488 P.2d 308, 310 (1971) as follows: 
[The trial court's] actions are indulged with 
a presumption of validity and correctness and 
the burden is upon the appellant to show a 
basis for upsetting them: either (1) that 
findings have been made when the evidence 
clearly preponderates the other way; [citation 
omitted] or (2) that there has been a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error; [citation omitted] or (3) that it 
appears plainly that there has been such an 
abuse of discretion that an inequity or 
injustice has resulted, [citation omitted] 
15 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Paf fel v. Paf fel, Utah, 
732 P.2d 96 (1986) provides further insight into the standards 
required of the trial judge. Appellant in that case had argued 
that since the trial court had failed to make findings 
". . . concerning respondent's income, 
expenses, or need for support . . . ," 
that such was reversible error. At 102, the Court cited with 
approval the previous case of Walker v. Walker, Utah, 707 P.2d 110 
(1985) and found that 
[a]s in Walker, the evidence in this case 
supports the lower court's order, and 
appellant has made no showing to rebut the 
presumption that the trial court did consider 
respondent's income, expenses, and need for 
support. 
The Paffel decision has been cited more recently in the 
case of Chambers v. Chambers, Utah App., 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(1992), where the court at 49, relying partly upon the Paffel case, 
stated as follows: 
The trial court is given considerable 
discretion to provide for spousal support, and 
such an award will not be overturned on appeal 
unless there has been a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion, [citations omitted] 
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The Chambers court also provided the following insight 
into alimony questions. At 49 the Court stated as follows: 
In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah 
App. 1989) , we outlined the factors to be 
considered by a trial court in determining 
alimony: "(1) the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability 
of the receiving spouse to produce a 
sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) 
the ability of the responding spouse to 
provide support." [citations omitted in 
original] "If these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb a trial 
court's alimony award unless such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." [citations omitted in 
original] 
In the case of Watson v. Watson, Utah App., 194 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 42 (1992) , the trial court had made the finding that Mrs. 
Watson, by agreement of the parties, had not worked outside the 
home and calculated Mr. Watson's income from five years of income 
tax returns. The court then made the following finding: 
Based upon [Mr. Watson's] ability to earn, and 
the needs of [Mrs. Watson], . . . 
The appeals court, at 43, found as follows: 
The trial court's written findings demonstrate 
that the court considered the factors set out 
in Schindler, and those findings are supported 
by the evidence. Therefore, we conclude that 
17 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in determining the alimony award. 
A review of this record adequately supports the 
conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's petition for modification. The evidence on the record 
presented to the Court on February 11, 1992 is really not 
controverted. It is only the application of fact to law that is 
controverted. Furthermore, it is clear that the Court considered 
all the Schindler factors. The Court listened to Plaintiff's 
testimony regarding her financial condition and needs (R, 457-465) 
and specifically in its findings referred to those circumstances 
along with Plaintiff's lifestyle decisions. (R, 490, 491) 
Furthermore, he specifically considered the abilities of both of 
these parties to earn (R, 490-491), and after considering those 
factors concluded that there was no basis to change alimony as 
requested by Plaintiff. There is no doubt that the Court also 
considered the historical capabilities of the parties to earn 
income, which is a legitimate consideration. English v. English. 
Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977) 
Just because Plaintiff does not agree with the result 
does not mean that the Court has abused its discretion. It is 
18 
clear that the Court has considered the three elements of 
Schindler, and as the Chambers case at 49 stated, as long as 
these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award unless such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. [citations omitted] 
Such an abuse of discretion has not and cannot be shown 
here, and the trial Court's judgment must be affirmed by this Court 
in all particulars. 
VIII. 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OP ATTORNEY FEES TO 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The determination of whether or not to grant attorney 
fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and cannot 
be overturned on appeal except in the case of an abuse of 
discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Ut. Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (1992); 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Ut. App., 1991). 
An award of attorney fees, according to Chambers 
must be based on evidence of the 
reasonableness of the requested fees, as well 
as the financial need of the receiving spouse, 
and the ability of the other spouse to pay. 
[citing] Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 
1337 (Ut. App., 1988) 
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The Court, in the consideration of the issues required by 
Schindler addressed above, also considered the relative abilities 
of the parties, having found as follows: 
In fact, it strikes me that under the 
circumstances of this case both of these 
parties are uniquely able to earn substantial 
amounts of money to meet their needs and 
obligations. (R, 490-491) 
Accordingly, the Court in addition made the following 
finding: 
I further find that each party should be 
ordered to pay their own individual attorney's 
fees and costs as they've incurred them. (R, 
492) 
Again, the Court's action is clothed with a presumption 
of validity, and cannot be overturned on appeal except upon a 
showing of an abusive discretion. Such showing has not and cannot 
be made, and the trial court's ruling on the issue of attorney fees 
must be upheld. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing argument clearly shows that Plaintiff has 
no right to appeal the Court's earlier denial of temporary alimony. 
The September 30, 1991 order has not been appealed, either as a 
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final judgment or as an interlocutory order, and Plaintiff has not 
preserved the issue to appeal presently. Accordingly, it is 
inevitable that this Court lacks jurisdiction to second-guess the 
trial court's denial of temporary alimony. 
As far as the issue of a change in permanent alimony is 
concerned, Appellee does not believe that Appellant has carried her 
burden in any respect. Appellee disagrees that the Court found a 
substantial change in circumstances, although it did recognize a 
"change." Even if the Court's conclusion is construed to 
constitute a "substantial change" of circumstances, the Court's 
ultimate conclusion was that an increase of alimony to Plaintiff 
was not warranted. Given that conclusion, Plaintiff's only 
argument is that the Court abused its discretion. 
A review of the case authorities set forth above 
recognizes that the trial court's discretion in matters of alimony, 
and including modifications of alimony, is very broad. The 
Appellate Court will not overturn the trial court's ruling unless 
Appellant can show an abuse of that discretion, and Defendant 
argues herein that Plaintiff has been unable to show such an abuse 
of discretion. Defendant has demonstrated in the foregoing 
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argument that the Court has considered the three factors set forth 
in the Schindler case, and that the Court's conclusion not to allow 
an increase in alimony was not an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiff has not really attacked the findings of the 
Court in this appeal, and for that reason Defendant has not sought 
to discuss the requirement that Plaintiff would otherwise have of 
marshalling the evidence. However, Defendant has demonstrated 
that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clothed 
with a presumption of validity unless and until Appellant can 
overcome that presumption by a clear showing that the Court abused 
its discretion. Plaintiff has failed in that endeavor in the 
opinion of Defendant, and the appeal must be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I T — day of January, 1993. 
^ETER W. GUYON/7 / 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellee David J. Wells 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE werejmailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to the following on this / x ^ day of January, 1993: 
James B. Hanks, Esq. 
Western Financial Ctr., Ste. 300 
376 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Rules 3, 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
TITLE I APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
RULE 
1. Scope of rules. 
2. Suspension of rules 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 
OF TRIAL COURTS 
3. Appeal as of right, how taken 
4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
6. Bond for costs on appeal. 
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties. 
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
9. Docketing statement. 
10. Motion for summary disposition. 
11. The record on appeal. 
12. Transmission of the record. 
13. Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court. 
TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, 
AND COMMITTEES 
14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention 
16. Filing of the record. 
17 /S tay pending review. 
18. "Applicability of other rules to review. 
TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS; HABEAS CORPUS 
19. Extraordinary writs. 
20. Habeas corpus proceedings. 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
21. Filing and service. 
22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
23. Motions. 
24. Briefs. 
25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
26. Filing and service of briefs. 
27. Form of briefs. 
28. Prehearing conference. 
29. Oral argument. 
30. Decision of the court: dismissal, notice of deci-
sion. 
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument 
without written opinion 
32. Interest on judgment 
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
34. Award of costs. 
Sd. fkti'tiba &r re&eanhg. 
36. Issuance of remittitur. 
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal. 
38. Substitution of parties. 
39. Duties of the clerk. 
40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER 
BETWEEN COURTS 
41. Certification of questions of law by United States 
courts. 
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of 
Appeals. 
43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Su-
preme Court 
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS 
45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court 
of Appeals. 
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
47. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
48. Time for petitioning. 
49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
FORMS 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES. 
Rule 1. Scope of rules . 
(a) Applicabil i ty of ru les . These rules govern the 
procedure before the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals of Utah in all cases. Applicability of these 
rules to the review of decisions or orders of adminis-
trative agencies is governed by Rule 18. When these 
rules provide for a motion or application to be made 
in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an adminis-
trative agency, commission, or board, the procedure 
for making such ^motion or application shall be gov-
erned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice 
of the trial court, administrative agency, commission, 
or board. 
(b) Reference £o "cour t . " Except as provided in 
Rule 43, when these rules refer to a decision or action 
by the court, the reference shall include a panel of the 
court. The term "trial court" means the court or tribu-
nal from which the appeal is taken. The term "appel-
late court" means the court to which the appeal is 
taken. 
(c) P r o c e d u r e es tabl ished by s ta tu te . If a proce-
dure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or 
review of an order of an administrative agency, com-
mission, board, or officer of the state which is incon-
sistent with one or more of these rules, the statute 
shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall ap-
ply to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jur isdic t ion. These rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as 
established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah 
R. App. P. 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
] In the interest of expediting a decision, the appel-
late court, on its own motion or for extraordinary 
tause shown, may, except as to the provisions of 
(Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the re-
quirements or provisions of any of these rules in a 
(particular case and may order proceedings in that 
:ase in accordance with its direction. 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS 
AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judg-
ments. An appeal may be taken from a district, juve-
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547 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 5 
nile, or circuit court to the appellate court with juris-
diction over the appeal from all final orders and judg-
ments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court 
within the time allowed by Rule 4. tFailure of an ap-
pellant to take any step other than the timely filing 
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the 
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the ap-
pellate court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more 
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or or-
der and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or 
may join in an appeal of another party after filing 
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. 
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of 
the appellate court upon its own motion or upon mo-
tion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the 
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the ad-
verse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the 
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appel-
late court. In original proceedings in the appellate 
court, the party making the original application shall 
be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the 
court to
 4which the appeal is taken 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking 
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of 
appeal by'serving personally"or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judg-
ment or order; or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known 
address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. 
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or 
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the ap-
peal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing 
fees as are established by law, and also the fee for 
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the 
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the 
clerk of the trial 'court shall immediately transmit 
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of 
its filing, together with the docketing fee, to the clerk 
of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the 
appellate court • shall enter »the appeal upon the 
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title 
given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as .such, but if the title does not con-
tain the name of,the appellant, such name shall be 
added to the title. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
,'t(a) Appeal from final judgment and prder. In a, 
casein ^ {richju^ appeal Jjs jttrmijbted as atmatter^of 
right fromj^iijal c^j^ntojthe jappejlate,court,,the 
the clerkjKw the Jnal c^urt within JO daysjafter^fee 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely 
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is * 
filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment 
under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new 
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion Similarly, if a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) un-
der Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an 
order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights 
of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall 
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion A notice 
of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the 
above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time mea-
sured from the entry of the order of the trial court 
disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry*of judgment or order. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of 
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice 
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file 
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within 
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule, whichever period last expires 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, 
may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expira-
tion of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the pre-
scribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after ex-
piration of the prescribed time shall be given to the 
other parties in accordance with the rules of practice 
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days 
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of 
entry
 t of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocu-
tory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal 
from an interlocutory order may be sought by any 
party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the ap-
pellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 
days after the entry "of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
. (b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner 
shall .file with*>theXlerk of the Supreme' Court an 
original aiid seven copies of the petition/or, ivith the< 
Clerk of the Court* of 'Appeals^an original and four 
copies, together with the fee for iiling a notice of ap-t 
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peal in the trial court and the docketing fee'in the 
appellate court. If ah order is issued authorizing the 
appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall immedi-
ately give notice of the order by mail to the respective 
parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the or-
der^  together with a copy of the petition and filing fee, 
to the trial court where the petition and order shall 
be filed in lieu* of a" notice'of appeal. If the petition is 
denied,t4the filing* fee shall be refunded. , 
^(c)" Content of petition. The petition shall con-
^w*^(lf AT statement of the facts necessary? to an 
s>t
— understanding of the controlling question of law 
f
^-determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
^ f j - ' (2)',A statement of the question 'of law'arid a 
^ ; ' demmistraiion^that the * question was properly 
|f^/raised^before 'the trial court ancl ruled upon; 
"'
li
 i.* :f(3) A statement of the reasons why an immedi-
'^^ate interlocutory appeal should be permitted; and 
.vW^iv^l£ s&tement of the reason why the appeal 
:
 f, may ^materially advance' the termination of the 
,} JJLitigationv , ,v, i/V;.-^ " ,,.,;-, ,>,v JlTr-[ - - -•• f; \0 
If 'KifflThe petition shall include a copy of the or-
;!'. Ider of the .trial couVt from which an,appeal is 
^ J ^ sought and ,an^ y" related findings of fact, conclu-
de ^ "sipns j)f Jaw and opinion. ^ ^ £-.^ U:Jtwniv.r +n 
^(d)( An^ver. ^Within 10 days after service of the 
petition, any\.qtner party may file an answer in oppo-
sition or concurrence. An original and seven copies of 
theanswershall be filed in .the Supreme Court. An 
original and four'copies shall be filed iri the Court of 
Appeals.'.The petition and any answer.shall be sub-
mitted without oral argument unless otherwise,or-
dered. ,l-;.,;l;/iuiv!}t;u^V.^ i Ji'>-'^ r:*-' p'ixyn*&'A 3-ft 
-Xf(e) jPrant of permission. An appeal from an inter-
locutory Vrder may be granted only if it appears that 
the order involves substantial rights'and may ihateri-
ally affect the. final decision or that* a determination 
of the con-ectness *of .the.'order* before final judgment 
will betterserve* thei.administratioh and interests of 
justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth' 
the particular issue or point of law which will be con-
sidered and may be on such temsj'including the fil-
ing of a'bond for costs and damages, as the appellate 
court may 'determine. If the petition is granted, the 
appeal shall be deemed to have been docketed by the 
granting of the petition, and all proceedings subse-
quent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and 
within the time required, for appeals from final judg-
ments. :-..*,? .-••^ -,-_vr^ i .-- •».:..-..;..:-v.^  . •./Viv*. ..-:-..,_ 
Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal, ^ i i*:^  V/$W 
fExcept in/a^cruiunal case,4 at'the time "of filing the 
notice of appeal,^ the appellant Jshall file With ,the no-
tice'*a 'bond for costs on appeal^ uriless1 ihe bond isJ 
waived in writing by the adverse party, or unless an 
affidavit as provided for in Section 21-7-3, Utah Code 
Ann: 1953 as amended, is nled.^h^Jxmd shall be in 
tKe sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as 
the|rial court may order on motion pf the appellee to, 
e^ jLU-e^  payment of costs"on appeal^  No separate bond. 
for^cpsts^  on appeal is^  required ,whejv a supersedeas; 
bond:isjTiled..^^Wndon a^ 
cient suretiesand .shall ,be conditioned to secure payr, appellate court in assigning cases to;the Supreme 
menjfqfcbstslf ;^ Court or to thei Ctfiirt of Appeals wlie^bolh^have ju-*j 
m^n^affirmed; or of such/costs as the appellate coiiri ~-^^---^*-4>—:±*--~:"^~^-*«^***-***tffl^**-e.:A_i-i: ° 
ina^ajyfudifthe'ju^girieiit is modified; The adverse^ 
partyjmay^except to thejsumciency :of the sureties mi 
a a ^ a S c t g i ^ 
Rule^BMJiiaj 
Rule 7/Security: Proceedings against sureties. 
Whenever these rules require or permit the'giving 
of security by a party, and security is'given in the 
form of a bond or stipulation or pother undertaking 
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent 
therein to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the 
trial court and must irrevocably appoint the'clerk of 
that court as an agent upon whom any papers affect-
ing liability on the bond or undertaking rhay be 
served. The sureties' liability may be enforced oh mo-
tion without the necessity of an independent action. 
The hfiotioh' and such notice of the motion as Ihe trial 
court prescribes "may be served on* the clerk "of the 
trial court; who ;shall forthwith'* mail copies to the 
sureties* if iheir addresses are* known. .-*? r^ir x' ° 
H^^mfe^^vpv^i ]?... y&?i%^$^rf: : 
Rulefc8. Stay or injunction pen<dihg" appeal. " 
5J(ajStay must ordinarily be sought in *the first 
instance in trial court; motion for stay in appel-
late court. Application for a stay of the judgment or 
order of a trial court pending appeal, or disposition of 
a petition under Rule 5, or for approval of a superse-
deas bond, or for an order suspending/ modifying, re-
storing* or' granting ah injunction during the pen-
dency of ah appeal must ordinarily be made in the 
first iristancein the trial court. A inotiori for such 
relief niay be'made to the appellate"court, but the 
mbtionrshall show that application'to'the trial court 
for the relief sought is not practicable,' or that the 
trial court hiias denied an application, or has failed to 
afford the relief which the applicant requested, with 
the reasons'given by the trial court for its* action. The 
motion/'shall als6vshow the reasons Tor ihe relief re-
quested and the fa t^s relied upon, arid/if the^acts'are. 
subject to dispute,'the motion shall be supported by "r 
affidavits or other sworn statemenii o? cdpie? thereof. 
With the motion shall be filed such'parts^ of the jrecord 
as^ are^ ''ireieyaiii! Reasonable notice of .ihe i^nquon shall 
be given" to all parties'.' The motion shall bei'filed'witK 
the,rclerk arid normally^will ^De^ <ronsidefedi( by, the 
cqiua, buVin 'exceptional cases wliere such procedure 
would be impracticable due tq. thq requirements of 
time, the application may be considered by a single 
justice or judge of the court, v
 U;': t ,li^ rt; tfc l- f 
* .(b)' Stay may be conditioned upon giving of 
bond. Relief available in the, appellate court under 
this rule may be conditioned upon the,filing of a bond 
or: other appropriate security Jn the trial, court. 
:((c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal 
cases pending ..appeal are governed by' Rule 27, 
U.RCrim.P.,^ ,-Si f/;if^A::--%l'w KCU-LZ :*"! ; .- a" 
Rule 9. Docketing statement, ^^{ffif">''•£> -ih 
.^(a)v.fJ1mei for filing. VVithin 21 days after a notice 
of. appeal,-cross-appeal, or a petition for,review is 
file^, the
 t appellant, cross-appellant, ;or petitioner, 
shall, file a docketing statement with ^ the.. clerk of the 
appellate court.. An original and seven -copies of thej 
docketing statement shall be filed in the Supreme/ 
Court. An original and four copies shall,be filed in ther 
Courjb^of,Appeals.^ - %\l&-^vMb&^ffi&i* y£ rx*sfa> 
AriCb) Purpose of docketing statement. The docket-^  
ing statement is'not a brief and should not containf 
arguments or procedural motions. ItHys juled by tKe 
